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the influence of the long-term rate of interest on the net flow of
funds to industry through the bond market, and suggest some of
the difficulties with monetary theories that posit a uniform and
simple causal relationship between bond yields and bond financing.
The relationship so far as it is observable in our data appears neither
very simple nor very stable. Further evidence to this effect will be
developed in the next section.
CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS IN CORPORATE BOND FINANCING
The series on corporate bond outstandings, although influenced
by the business cycle, is dominated by trend movements. The busi-
ness cycle affects more strongly the net change in outstandings and
the related series on offerings and extinguishments.
Total offerings of corporate bonds and each of the two compo-
nent series —bondsoffered to refund Other bonds, and bonds
offered to raise new money —exhibitnegative conformity to the
business cycle. This means that as the pace of general business
activity quickens, the volume of bonds offered in the market typi-
cally falls; contrariwise, as the pace of general business activity
slackens, the volume of bonds offered typically. rises. The same
behavior characterizes the gross cash proceeds obtained by corpora-
tions from sale of bonds. On the other hand, total bond extinguish-
ments, bond repayments (total extinguishments less refundings),
and gross cash payments by corporations at extinguishment all
show the reverse pattern of behavior. Typically they are positively
conforming series, rising during business expansions and falling
during business contractions.
The cyclical behavior of the net change in outstandings (which,
as we have seen, may be interpreted either as the difference between
total offerings and extinguishments or as the difference between
new-money offerings and repayments) is governed by the behavior
of its components. During business cycle expansions, offerings usu-
ally fall while extinguishments rise, so that the net changes in
outstandings fall. Conversely, during business cycle contractions,
offerings rise while extinguishments fall, so that the net changes in
outstandings rise. The average cyclical pattern of the net change in
20outstandings is exhibited in ChartRoughly the same pattern
characterizes the net cash flow to the corporate sector of the econ-
omy from sale of corporate bonds. Thus, both net cash receipts and
net par amount of bond financing are inverted with respect to the
pace of general business activity.
These findings throw new light upon the familiar theory that
"credit," in a generic sense, plays a dominant role in the business
cycle. Clearly a distinction needs to be drawn between the various
types of credit. Many types of financing —forexample short-term
and stock financing —appearto behave in the way theory would
indicate; but bond financing runs a contrary course to other types
and thus acts, so to speak, as a stabilizing force.
Some idea of the stabilizing role of the bond market during
business cycles may be gained by comparing turning points in the
bond and stock series with turning points in general business cycles.
If we take a stand at the point in the general business cycle at which
stock offerings turn upward, the financial process typically appears
to unfold as follows. Soon after the upturn in stock offerings and
while general business activity is still falling, the net changes in
bond outstandings turn dOwnward. The immediate cause is a rise
in extinguishments, possibly induced by the repayment of some
funded debt from the proceeds of stock offerings. Since certain
corporations are still financing their capital programs via the bond
market at this time, bond offerings continue to rise through early
business expansion. As stock prices become increasingly attractive,
corporations turn from bond to stock financing; bond offerings
turn downward; and the net changes in bond outstandings con-
tinue to fall. These movements persist until a late stage in business
expansion, when stock offerings and stock prices fall. In the next
stage, proceeds from the stock market are no longer obtainable for
the retirement of bonds; bond extinguishments turn downward;
and the net volume of bond financing begins to rise. Bond offerings
For a description of the derivation of such patterns, see Arthur F. Burns and
Wesley C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles (National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1946). Essentially the method consists in removing the seasonal from
the series, calculating the relative standing of the series at nine stages within
each business cycle, and striking an average of the relative standings at each
stage over all cycles covered by the series.
21continue to fall, however, since the bond market moves sympatheti-
cally with the stock market at this point. Soon after the business
peak, the bond market stabilizes, and bond offerings turn upward,
thus reinforcing the rise of the net changes in outstandings. These
movements continue until late in business contraction, when the
stock market recovers. The entire process is then re-enacted during
the next business cycle.
It will be observed from the preceding discussion that the stock
market complements the bond market over business cycles. In our
opinion, the strategic variable governing the relative volume of
financing in these two markets is either the ratio of stock to bond
prices or the level of stock prices alone. A comparison of the rele-
vant lines on Chart 6 will show these relationships: When the
ratio of stock to bond prices moves upward from one cycle stage
to the next, the ratio of bond financing to stock offerings usually
moves downward. And conversely, when the ratio of stock to bond
prices moves downward, the ratio of bond financing to stock offer-
ings moves upward. This finding, which is amply borne out by
the evidence, may be explained on the basis of the differential
costs of financing in the two markets. The significant point is that
bond prices alone (or bond yields alone) appear to play a rela-
tively minor role in this story. Indeed, during the cycle, corporations
frequently borrow more heavily when bond yields are high than
when bond yields are low. As the chart shows, bond prices and the
net changes in outstandings move in the same direction during
parts of the cycle, and in the opposite direction during others.
Detailed study of monthly data reveals that the timing relationships
can be viewed in either of two ways: (1) The net changes con-
sistently lead the corresponding turns in bond prices by fairly long
intervals; or (2) the net changes lag behind the opposite turns in
bond prices, also by fairly long intervals. These complex timing
relationships cannot be adequately explained, we believe, by any
simple theory of the response of bond financing to bond yields, or
without reference to the dominating influence of the stock market.
In our view it is necessary to substitute a theory of differential
money costs for a bond yield theory in order to account for the
cyclical behavior of the bond market.
22CHART 6—Average Cyclical Patterns for Bonds and Stocks
during Cycles in General Business Activity
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Trough Ii Tro1ugh Trough TroughMuch empirical research remains to be done before we can
obtain a well-rounded picture of the behavior of money and credit
during business cycles.'0 What, for example, happens to bank credit
and short-term interest rates in each cycle stage, and what is the
relationship of these factors to funded debt and equity funds? How
are these various credit series influenced by the changing cash
requirements of business corporations over the cycle? One may
conjecture that as business expands, cash is absorbed increasingly
into inventories and trade credit; that corporations replenish their
depleted cash accounts through the banking system and the stock
market; and that surplus funds obtained from these sources are
used to retire funded debt. During business contractions, on the
other hand, the stock market ceases to be an attractive source of
funds; banks allow marginal loans to run and the gap is par-
tially filled through the liquidation of inventories and trade credit
and the flotation of bonds.
The foregoing analysis describes the typical behavior of bond
financing during the cycles of the period 1900-1938. An important
exception, however, occurred after the stock market collapse of
1929. At first the net volume of bond financing increased in the
usual way, but in late 1931 the bond market broke badly as the
result of a tightening of the money markets and a general deteriora-
tion of credit. The bond market therefore could not perform its
typical contracyclic function at the business trough of 1932. Dur-
ing the next cycle, 1932-38, and on through the wartime cycle,
1938-46, bond financing again followed its typical pattern, moving
downward during business expansions and upward during business
contractions. During the following transiti6nal cycle, 1946-49,
however, the series again behaved atypically. Indeed, in that cycle
the net volume of bond financing reached an all-time high in 1948
at the crest of the business expansion. The postwar experience raises
important questions as to the applicability of the earlier relation-
10Acontribution in this direction has recently been made by use Mintz in
Deterioration in the Quality of Foreign Bonds Issued in the United States,
1920-1930 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951). Mrs. Mintz
observed a complementary relation between flotations of foreign bonds and of
domestic stocks in the cycles of the twenties.
24ships to the economy of the future. Rising commodity prices and
taxes, and the relatively low level of stock prices, we have seen,
have all encouraged bond and discouraged stock financing since
the war. Similar changes have affected the relationship between
stock and bond financing in the past and may well affect it in the
future.
AGGREGATE DEFAULT AND SETTLEMENT EXPERIENCE
ON CORPORATE BOND INVESTMENTS
A corporate bond default is defined as the failure to pay principal
or interest promptly when due. Comprehensive data on corporate
bond defaults in major industry and size groups will be presented
in the volume on which this paper is based. The series are of the
interrelated "stock-flow" type used generally throughout the in-
vestigation. They. provide annual estimates of the volume of bonds
outstanding in default, of new defaults, of default settlements
(bonds previously in default that were restored to good standing,
extinguished through reorganization, etc.), and of the net change
in outstanding defaults (new defaults less default settlements).
Ancillary estimates are also provided for special categories of new
defaults and settlements. More detailed breakdowns by minor
industry groups and other classifications will be presented in a later
monograph. Chart 7 gives the picture for all industries combined,
and the discussion will bring in some of the differences between
major industry groups.
Between 1900 and the onset of the Great Depression the
aggregate volume of corporate bonds outstanding in default was
quite small, both in absolute and in relative terms. During this
period the average par amount of bonds outstanding in default
was only $0.4 billion or 2.7 percent of total outstandings. With
the financial difficulties of the early thirties, outstanding defaults
climbed rapidly to a peak level in 1936 of about $4 billion or 15
percent of outstandings. Although there was a mild improvement
in 1936-37, the situation again deteriorated and the amount out-
standing in default in 1940 was about as large as in 1936. After
that, default settlements generally exceeded new defaults, so that
the volume of outstanding defaults declined.
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